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Mothers as Suckers:
Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse
Cynthia Lee Starnes*
ABSTRACT: Aiming to protect divorcing mothers from the market costs of
caretaking, the American Law Institute has proposed a new alimony model
based on loss sharing. Good intentions notwithstanding, the Institute's
rationale and vocabulary perpetuate a dispiriting view of mothers as
suckers, economically incapacitated by their unpaid family labor. A far
better reform discourse lies in the gender-neutral language and egalitarian
principles of partnership. In this Article, Professor Starnes offers an enriched
partnership model that complements the marital partnership model she
earlier proposed. This new model provides a compelling rationale for income
sharing during the minority of marital children, even as it casts mothers as
full stakeholders in marriage, equal rather than subservient, empowered
rather than incapacitated, respected rather than pitied.
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MOTHERS AS SUCKERS
Once upon a time,
there was a woman who discovered
she had turned into the wrong person.
INTRODUCTION
Many mothers have been stunned to learn that after years of viewing
themselves as proud and valuable contributors to marriage, to family, to a
new generation, the law of divorce views them as suckers. Surely this is a
mistake, a mother might insist, a confusion of identities, a dialectical lapse
that will be corrected as soon as it is discovered. Sadly, there is no mistake.
The dispiriting message is that primary caretakers, the vast majority of whom
are mothers,2 have been duped into providing free family caretaking at great
personal economic cost; a price they must pay'for their imprudent ways. The
American Law Institute ("ALI" or "Institute"), in its recent Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution,' does little to alter this view of mothers. Instead, the
ALI has adopted a vocabulary and concept that cast mothers as economic
casualties of marriage, sometimes entitled to reparations, but never as equal
stakeholders entitled to share in marital profits.
The story of a mother's status as a marital casualty begins with the
market costs of mothering. Because time and energy spent caring for
1. ANNE TYLER, BACK WHEN WE WERE GROWNUPS 3 (2001).
2. See discussion infa Part I.B. Because mothers are performing the majority of childcare
within families, this Article will use the term "mother" rather than "parent" to refer to a primary
caretaker, taking note of Ann Crittenden's observation that "the politically correct term for
child-rearing is 'parenting'-neatly disguising the fact that the mothers are doing most of the
work." ANN CRIrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 24 (2001).
3. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2000) [hereinafter
Al PRINCIPLES].
4. "Mothering" is used in this Article in its broadest sense to describe both the process of
protecting, nurturing and training children and the activities that sustain the home in which
children are raised. Under this definition, "mothering" thus includes both caretaking and
homemaking. Katharine Silbaugh uses the term "housework" to include "preparing meals,
washing dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shopping, washing and ironing, paying bills,
auto maintenance, driving.., making coffee, feeding the baby, emptying garbage, answering
the telephone, planning family activities, making beds, caring for pets, weeding, sweeping
floors.., putting clothes away." Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the
Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1996).Joan Williams describes seven types of "care work": growth
work; housework and yardwork; household management; social capital development; emotion
work; care for the sick; and daycare. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity:
Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1441, 1462-65 (2001).
Mothering need not be performed by a birthgiver. As Sara Ruddick observes, "All
human life begins in some woman's birth giving but no woman's birth giving is ever more than
a beginning." Sara Ruddick, Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth, in REPRESENTATIONS OF
MOTHERHOOD 29, 44 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994). A functional definition of mothering
recognizes that "a child is mothered by whoever protects, nurtures, and trains her." Id. at 35.
Thus while a father could undertake mothering, this Article focuses on women who mother,
since women are overwhelmingly the primary caretakers of children. See discussion infra Part
1515
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children are not invested in education, training, or labor-force participation,
primary caretaking often reduces earnings and ultimately earning capacity.
Recent studies confirm that motherhood is associated with a significant
decline in wages, which increases with the number of children in the
household.5
Married women may be unaware of the costs of mothering as they share
income with a spouse more fully invested in the labor force. Divorce,
however, shatters any illusion of economic security and self-worth. Though a
mother's caretaking has benefited her spouse and family, she alone must
bear its costs, often as a single parent with little property," no alimony,7 and
insufficient child support8 after divorce. In a worst-case scenario, divorce
exposes the undignified reality that a primary caretaker is "just a man away
from poverty." 9
Concerned commentators have offered an array of divorce reform
proposals, emphasizing a married mother's contribution to a couple's joint
parenting responsibility and challenging the notion that equity lies in
The focus here on women with children is not meant to suggest that childless women
are adequately protected by current divorce law. Although equities involving childless women
may be more idiosyncratic than those of mothers, their treatment at divorce also deserves
scrutiny. Indeed, the ALI Principles may unfairly prioritize the claims of child-bearing women
over those of childless women. See Al PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 (proposing preferential
alimony rules for primary caretakers); see also discussion infra Part IIA. For a brief discussion of
the equities between childless women and those with children, see Cynthia Lee Starnes, Victims,
Breeders, Joy, and Math: First Thoughts on Compensatory Spousal Payments Under the Principles, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 137, 142-44 (2001). The treatment of childless women in divorce,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
5. See discussion infra Part I.A.
6. Studies consistently report that most divorcing couples have few assets. See, e.g., Marsha
Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 662-63 (1991) (finding that divorcing couples in New York
usually had less than $25,000 in divisible assets); Ilene E. Shapiro & Barry P. Schatz, Has the
Illinois Equitable Distribution Statute Advanced the Cause of the Homemaker?, 74 ILL. Bj. 492, 500
(1986) (observing that "most estates are too small to support anyone").
7. Fewer than twenty percent of divorcing women have an alimony award entitling them
to continue to share income with a spouse after divorce. SeeALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.04
cmt. a (summarizing empirical studies of the incidence of alimony). Joan Williams reports that
only about eight percent of women are awarded alimony. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER
122 (2000).
8. See NANCY E. DowD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 222 (2000) ("Strong evidence
demonstrates that even if... all support were paid, the support would be inadequate to meet
the needs of children."); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 57, 62 (2002)
("Increasing numbers of families are headed by women who receive inadequate or no child
support from absent fathers."); Barbara Stark, Pomo Parenting, 80 OR. L. REV. 1035, 1061 (2001)
(book review) ("[Elven if child support is paid, it is usually inadequate.").
9. NAT'L DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS NETWORK, THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... A STATUS
REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980s 60 (1990). Lower-
income mothers who were already in or near poverty before divorce may experience a less
precipitous decline in their standard of living. Higher income mothers may have assets
sufficient to buffer them against any loss of the marital standard of living.
1516 [2005]
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cutting off mothers from the family wage. ° These proposals have
culminated in the recent ALI Principles, an amalgam of best-practice
divorce laws and revolutionary reform proposals. Among these proposals is a
dramatic new alimony scheme with special provisions targeting primary
caretakers.
As states reexamine their no-fault divorce laws and evaluate the
Institute's proposals, reform seems likely. But there is danger that even well-
meaning action to protect mothers will effect change that imposes new costs
even as it addresses old ones. This danger is made more real by the ALI's
10. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989); WILLIAMS,
supra note 7; June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 359 (1994); Martha Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Ann Estin, Maintenance,
Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721 (1993); Joan M. Krauskopf,
Comments on Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 417
(1994); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV.
539 (1990); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989);
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).
Some feminist commentators have urged public law responses to the costs of
caretaking. Martha Fineman, for example, argues for public support for the work of caregivers.
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161-64, 231-33 (1995). Because caretaking has public value,
reasons Fineman, it creates a "social debt-a debt that binds each and every member of society,
not only individual family members or receivers of care." Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract
and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1410-11 (2001). Fineman warns that income-sharing
proposals privilege only traditional, heterosexual women and do not meet women's needs at
large. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform," 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 287, 299-304 (1996). Vicki Schultz agrees, adding that "joint property feminists
tie homemakers' pay to their spouses' income-a methodology that introduces severe class
bias." Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV, 1881, 1912 (2000). Of great concern to
Schultz is the possibility that "[tlhe wife of a high-level executive who gets one-half his earnings
for caring for the house and kids is paid much more than the wife of a janitor, for example,
even though both wives may be doing essentially the same work." Id. Moreover, says Schultz,
feminists should not be encouraging women to invest in patriarchal relationships. Id. at 1908.
It is not clear that public and private law solutions must be either/or propositions.
Because caretaking often benefits both an individual spouse and society at large, both private
and public measures should be employed to ensure equity for caretakers. If a well-positioned
spouse is not required to share income with the caretaker who has conferred direct benefits on
him, that spouse will receive a windfall at the cost of society at large. When private resources are
unavailable, either because a spouse's income is low or because the caretaker is alone or part of
a couple, perhaps a same-sex couple not subject to divorce law, public law solutions are
necessary and appropriate. Moreover, a private-law income-sharing proposal need not and
should not reinforce patriarchal marriage. Actually, income-sharing proposals tend to have
exactiy the opposite effect, casting mothers as equal participants in marriage rather than
subservient participants hoping for a handout. As Martha Ertman rightly observes, "[pirimary
wage earners might be less enthusiastic about gendered specialization of labor if they had to
foot the bill for it." Martha M. Ertman, Love and Work: A Response to Vicki Schultz's Life's Work, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 848, 858 (2002). Partnership, in particular, offers a vocabulary and conceptual
model for income sharing that furthers the norms of egalitarian marriage many feminists and
same-sex couples seek. For such a proposal, see discussion infra Part II.
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disturbing conceptual basis for alimony. While its economic bottom line is
surely an improvement over existing law, the Institute's rationale warrants
careful scrutiny, for at its core is an emphasis on loss" that perpetuates a
view of mothers as casualties-of a market economy, of marriage, of
motherhood. It would be a mistake to assume this assignment of status can
do no harm, to assume that the linguistic path from identification of harm
to proposed solution is unimportant. On the contrary, a conceptual
rationale and its linguistic tools can have a profound normative impact,
"form[ing] our minds by habituating them to certain modes of attention,
certain ways of seeing and conceiving of oneself and of the world."' 2 By
casting mothers as incapacitated persons entitled to protection, the Institute
resurrects long-abandoned themes of coverture,13 affirming the second-class
status of women that feminists have so long fought against. Though this
result is surely inadvertent, it is not inconsequential.
Casting mothers as suckers might be less offensive if it were more
necessary to achieve the Institute's goals. It is not. A far better reform option
lies in an analogy to the egalitarian principles and gender-neutral vocabulary
of partnership. This Article proposes a new, enriched partnership model
that begins by casting married mothers and fathers as equal partners in
parenting who jointly contribute to, share responsibility for, and benefit
from parenting. This parenting-partnership model provides a compelling
rationale for post-divorce income sharing during the unfinished parental
work of raising minor children. This new model supplements the marital-
partnership model I have proposed elsewhere, 14 which will in some cases
also entitle a mother to a buyout at divorce. For mothers, the language and
principles of partnership bring economic equity to divorce, affirming the
importance of a mother's contributions and sending a message of equality
11. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
12. James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REv. 161,
166 (1986). White, however, advises resistance to economic discourse about marriage, fearing
its tendency to mis-value the work of women. Id. at 190. For an argument that White's reasoning
actually supports economic discourse about marriage, see Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 109 (1997). For an
exploration of the assignment of status as part of the structure of social reality, see JOHN R.
SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOcIAL REALITY 59-78 (1995).
13. Under coverture, a wife's disabilities entitled her to the protection of her husband,
who, as the recipient of her services, was morally bound to shelter her in much the same way he
was bound to shelter his children. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). For an
argument that coverture survives in the form of property laws that allocate family wealth to
husbands, see Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theoy of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2229 (1994). Offensive as coverture may be to contemporary ears, its result was to protect
women. The price for that protection is clear. The price should be equally clear when mothers
are cast as disabled persons in need of protection in this more contemporary setting.
14. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67, 108-39 (1993).
1518 [2005]
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rather than subservience, of empowerment rather than incapacity, of respect
rather than pity.
Part I of this Article surveys reports of the earnings gap between
mothers and non-mothers and concludes that the cost of motherhood
requires legal intervention at divorce to ensure mothers' fair treatment. Part
II presents a brief summary of the ALI's loss-sharing alimony model,
explores its casting of mothers as market losers, and identifies the model's
significant quantification problems. Finally, Part III proposes, as a reform
alternative, a parenting-partnership model for alimony, which provides a
conceptual rationale and a quantification mechanism for income-sharing
during the unfinished parental work of raising children.
I. MOTHERING Is NOT FREE
Evaluating the appropriateness and adequacy of legal intervention on
behalf of mothers depends initially on an understanding of the work and the
costs of mothering. Unfortunately, the reality is that whether she is a Betty
Crocker,15 a Soccer Mom 16 or a Gapper,' 7 a mother's primary caretaking
responsibilities often reduce her earnings and her earning capacity.
A. THE MOTHER/NON-MOTHER EARNINGS GAP
Reports of the economic costs of mothering are not new. In his much-
cited 1988 study of the male/female wage gap, Victor Fuchs concluded that
the primary explanation for women's lower earnings was not employment
discrimination, but rather family responsibilities that limit women's career
investments.'" Looking at women ages 30 to 39, and controlling for
education, Fuchs found that hourly wages declined proportionately with the
number of children in the household.' 9 For women, observed Fuchs, "the
greatest barrier to economic equality is children."
20
15. "Betty Crocker" is used here to refer to a full-time homemaker. See generally Cynthia
Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom and Divorce: A Message from Detergent Manufacturers,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 285. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
16. "Soccer Mom" is used here to refer to a primary caretaker who also works in the paid
economy, either part or full-time. See generally Starnes, supra note 15. See infra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text.
17. "Gapper" describes someone with gaps in her employment history, for example, a
woman who periodically leaves the job market to assume full-time caretaking responsibilities
and subsequently returns to the labor force, either as a full or part-time worker. See infra notes
69-71 and accompanying text.
18. VicTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMic EQUALITY 62 (1988).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 147.
1519
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More recent studies suggest Fuchs's observation may be as true today as
it was in 19 8 8 ." In 1996, Furchtgott-Rott and Stolba publicized the stunning
news that, notwithstanding reports of a continuing wage gap between men
and women, the 1993 earnings of childless women ages 27 to 33 were 98% of
the earnings of men in the same age group.22 Also using men as a
comparative baseline, Sigte-Rushton and Waldfogel studied the effects of
motherhood on lifetime, rather than single-year, earnings. 2s Drawing on
2000 data, they compared the cumulative earnings of men and women from
ages 19 to 60.24 Among women with a medium education,2 - those who were
childless earned 58% of male earnings; those with one child earned 52% of
male earnings; and those with two children earned 49% of male earnings.2
Numerous other studies have explored the impact of motherhood on
women's earnings by using childless women rather than men as a
comparative baseline. In her 1998 survey of the literature, Jane Waldfogel
observed that "researchers typically find a family penalty of 10-15% for
21. SeeJane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP., 137, 153 (1998) (stating that Fuchs's conclusion "is at least as true today as it was
a decade ago").
22. DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA, WOMEN'S FIGURES: THE ECONOMIC
PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 8 (1996). Using 1991 data, Waldfogel compared the wages of
young men and women (with a mean age of 30), and found that childless women earned 90.1%
of average male earnings; mothers earned 72.6% of average male earnings; and married
mothers earned 76.9% of average male earnings. Waldfogel, supra note 21, at 145. Using 1994
data, Waldfogel compared the hourly wages of men and women in the wider age range of 24 to
45. Id. at 144. She found that childless women earned 81.3% of average male earnings (up from
68.4% in 1978), while mothers earned 73.4% of average male earnings (up from 62.5% in
1978). Id. The married mothers in Waldfogel's study fired better than mothers in general,
earning 76.5% of average male earnings in 1994. Id.
Had Waldfogel compared the earnings of married mothers with those of married
fathers, the earnings disparity might have been even greater since "married men, most of whom
have children, earn more than other men, with estimates of the marriage premium for men
ranging from 10-15 percent." Id. at 143 (citing Joyce Jacobsen & Wendy Rayack, Do Men Whose
Wives Work Really Earn Less?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 268 (1996); Sanders Korenman & David
Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282 (1991);
and Eng Seng Loh, Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for White Males, 31 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 566 (1996)).
23. Wendy Sigle-Rushton & .Jane Waldfogel, Motherhood and Women's Earnings in
Anglo-American, Continental European, and Nordic Countries 1 (Jan. 2004) (paper prepared
for Conference on Cross-National Comparisons of Expenditures on Children, Princeton
University), at http://www.create.no/espe-2004/sider/pdf/waldfogel.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
24. Id. at 11.
25. "Medium education includes those who completed secondary school and may also
have completed some higher education, but without receiving a bachelor's degree or
equivalent, e.g. those with a high school degree or some college in the U.S." Id. at 12-13. Low-
skilled mothers are those without a high school degree, and high-skilled mothers have
completed at least an undergraduate degree. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
[2005]1520
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women with children as compared to women without children." 7 In a 2001
study using data from 1982 through 1993,8 Budig and England identified a
wage gap between mothers and childless women of about 7% per child.
Interestingly, Budig and England reported that the motherhood penalty is
higher for women who work full-time than for those who work part-time;
30
that women in "heavily male professional and managerial jobs" experience
smaller penalties than those in other jobs;3' that Black and Latino mothers
experience smaller penalties for third and subsequent births than other
mothers; 32 and that "[s]econd children reduce wages more than a first child,
especially for married women."33 In a 2003 study searching for educational
predictors of the size of the motherhood penalty, Anderson, Binder, and
Krause found that medium-skilled mothers experience more persistent and
severe income losses than either low-skilled or high-skilled mothers. 4
27. Waldfogel, supra note 21, at 143. See generally FUCHS, supra note 18; Korenman &
Neumark, supra note 22; Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. Soc.
REV. 209 (1997).
28. Michelle J. Budig & Paul England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REV.
204,211 (2001).
29. Id. at 219. Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson suggest that Budig and England's
report of a 7% gap between mothers and childless women "substantially understates" the costs
of mothering because it compares women who work the same number of hours and thus fails to
take account of the principal economic impact of motherhood, which is reduced working time.
JERRYA.JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER INEQUALITY
111 (2004). Jacobs and Gerson cite, as a more accurate figure, Ann Crittenden's estimate that
the lost lifetime earnings of a mother can exceed $500,000 for middle-income women and over
$1,000,000 for college-educated women. 1d; see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 8.
Other studies report an earnings gap of about 3% per child. See Deborah Anderson et
al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty: Which Mothers Pay It and Why? AM. ECON. REV., May 2002, at 354,
356-57 (2002) (citing a gap of 3% to 5% for one child and 5% to 7% for two or more
children); Hiromi Taniguchi, The Timing of Childbearing and Women's Wages, 61 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1008,1014 (1999) (citing a 3% penalty per child).
30. Budig & England, supra note 28, at 219.
31- id.
32. Id
33. Id.
34. Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience,
Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273, 291 (2003);
see also Budig & England, supra note 28, at 219 (finding that "high-level, 'male' jobs penalize
women a bit less for having children").
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that motherhood does not impact college-
educated women.lane Waldfogel, for example, has reported that college-educated mothers are
less likely to have a career than non-mothers. See Waldfogel, supra note 21, at 143 (finding that
based on 1980s data, only 31% of college-educated women worked full-time over a three-year
period, as compared with 67% of non-mothers, and that only 18% of mothers had income
above the 25th percentile, as compared with 45% of non-mothers) (citing Claudia Goldin,
Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE
(Francine Blau & Ronald Ehrenberg eds., 1997)). Waldfogel's observation is consistent with
Fuchs's report that more than 50% of the female corporate officers in his survey were childless,
while over 95% of the male officers were fathers. FUCI IS, supra note 18, at 66.
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In a recent study aimed at determining whether the wage gap between
women with children and those without children is shrinking, Avellar and
Smock examined the earnings over time of two cohorts of women. 5 The first
cohort consisted of women who were ages 21 to 33 in 1975 and ages 31 to 42
in 1985; the second cohort consisted of women who were ages 21 to 29 in
1986 and ages 33 to 41 in 1998.36 The researchers found an hourly wage gap
between mothers and non-mothers of $3.14 in the first cohort and $2.94 in
the second cohort.37 From this data, they concluded that the motherhood
penalty has not declined. "For both cohorts of women," said Avellar and
Smock, "taking into account an array of variables, children decrease
women's wages significantly, and this penalty has been quite stable." 9
Mothers who intermittently drop out of the labor force for significant
periods are likely to have lower lifetime earnings than women with
uninterrupted labor force attachment, simply because of foregone wages
during employment gaps. A 2004 study by Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel
0
confirms this prediction. Comparing the lifetime earnings of mothers and
childless women between age 19 and age 45, these researchers found that
women with one child earned 89% of childless women's earnings and that
41
women with two children earned 80% of childless women's earnings.
There is some question as to whether the hourly earnings of women
with employment gaps ever rebound to the level of non-Gappers, that is,
whether past employment gaps cause permanent reductions in future
earnings. Jacobsen and Levin report that although there is a partial-rebound
effect, Gappers never catch up to non-Gappers.4 2 "Even women whose labor-
35. Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, Has the Price of Motherhood Declined Over Time?: A
Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty, 65J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 597, 600 (2003).
36. Id. The cohorts included only women with at least two years of wages. Id
37. Id. at 602. Using a "fixed-effects" model, Avellar and Smock found a motherhood
penalty of 3.8% in the first cohort and 3.3% in the second cohort, a decrease they label
statistically insignificant. Id. at 600, 603. Net of other variables, Avellar and Smock reported a
motherhood penalty of about 1.6% per child in the early cohort and about 1% in the later
cohort. Id. at 603.
38. Id. at 604.
39. Id.
40. Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, supra note 23.
41. Id. at 21. Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel speculate that a comparison of the earnings of
mothers and fathers would likely reveal an even larger pay gap since fathers tend to earn more
than non-fathers. Id. at 17.
42. Joyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin, Effects of Intermittent Labor Force Attachment on
Women's Earnings, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1995, at 18. Jacobsen and Levin define a "labor
force break" as unemployment for six months or longer after receipt of one's last educational
degree. Id. at 15; see also Budig & England, supra note 28, at 218 (suggesting that the similarly
high child penalties of married and divorced women, as opposed to never-married women,
imply that married mothers' wage penalties are "long-lasting, enduring even if the marriage
ends"). Relying on older data, Mincer and Polachek found that women who remain out of the
labor market after the birth of their first child suffer a decline in earning capacity of about 1.5%
per year. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of
1522 [2005]
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force gap occurred more than twenty years ago still earn between 5% and
7% less than women who never left the labor force and have comparable
levels of experience. In their hypothetical case of a woman who left the
labor force at age 25 and returned at age 32, Jacobsen and Levin calculate
that the cost of a seven year gap in employment is effectively ten years of
earnings."
While estimates of the size of the pay gap between women with children
and those without children vary depending on methodologies, measures of
motherhood, statistical models and control variables, a persistent and
perhaps increasing 5 pay gap is consistently reported across studies. 46 The
explanation for these costs lies at least partly in the curious persistence of
traditional marital roles.
B. THE MOTHER/FATHER CARETAKING GAP
The explanation for the costs of mothering is simple enough: women
who do the cooking, the laundering, the tutoring, the shopping, the
chauffeuring, the bed-time story-reading, and the bathroom cleaning invest
time and energy at home that limit their opportunity to invest in other
things.47 Studies consistently show that whether or not they work outside the
home, women perform the vast majority of domestic chores.
In a time-use survey based on 2003 data, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported that adult women in households with children under age 18 spent
Women, in ECON. OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 415 (Theodore W.
Schultz ed., 1974).
43. Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 42, at 18. By the 20th year, however, "this difference is
significant only at the 10-percent significance level." Id.
44. Id. Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel suggest a more optimistic future for Gappers. These
researchers report that although mothers' earnings initially drop with the birth of children, "by
the age of 45, .. . mothers have rebounded so that their earnings are not far below those of
non-mothers.". Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, supra note 23, at 19. The Sigle-Rushton and Walfogel
study, however, considered all mothers, not just Cappers, and employed a definition of mother
likely to falsely cast some mothers as non-mothers. Id at 12. Only women with children in their
households are counted as mothers. Id. Although their study excludes women beyond age 45,
any woman who bore her last child at age 20 to 26 might erroneously be counted as a non-
mother, since that child would have reached majority and may have left home before this
mother reached age 45. This problematic definition of mother may shrink the wage disparity
between actual mothers and non-mothers by counting a mother whose children have left home
as a non-mother.
45. In 1998,Jane Waldfogel reported the little-publicized fact that "the family gap between
women with children and women without children has been rising in recent years, even as the
gender gap between women and men has been narrowing." Waldfogel, supra note 21, at 143.
46. SeeAvellar & Smock, supra note 35, at 598; Waldfogel, supra note 21, at 143.
47. A fuller explanation, of course, would also cite the preparatory behavior that leads
potential mothers to forego training and education leading to jobs that would be difficult to
juggle with home responsibilities, and mothers' willingness to trade higher pay and
employment for which they are trained for more flexible hours in a more proximate location.
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about 1.7 hours per day providing primary childcare, 4" as opposed to about
0.8 hours (50 minutes) for men in such households.49 When the youngest
child was under age 6, women averaged 2.7 hours of primary childcare per
day, while men averaged 1.2 hours.5 °
The Bureau's figures come as no surprise, given the multitude of
studies reporting that mothers undertake a disproportionately large share of
family chores." Naomi Cahn, for example, notes that "mothers of pre-school
age children spend 100 hours more per month than men in childcare." 52 In
a study cited by Hochschild, husbands performed 45 to 50% of household
work in only 18% of dual-earner families; none of the husbands studied did
more.53 Silbaugh reports that women spend more than half of their working
hours on housework while men spend less than one-fourth of their working
hours on such work.54 In a curious study reported by Rhode, only one
husband in twenty made the bed in which he slept.55 These primary family
responsibilities often take a toll, leaving women with less time and energy to
devote to paid employment.56
48. "Primary childcare activities include physical care; playing with children; reading to
children; assistance with homework; attending children's events; taking care of children's
health care needs; and dropping off, picking up, and waiting for children." BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AMERICAN TIME-USE SURVEY, TECHNICAL NOTES (2004)
[hereinafter BLS 9/04].
49. MeL at tbl. 7. For a colorful commentary on this report, see Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Real
Men Don't Clean Bathrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 4, at 3.
50. BLS 9/04, supra note 48, at tbl. 7.
51. See, e.g., David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic
Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1993) (finding that
women assume 70% to 80% of all housework); see also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN xiv (1991) (concluding that the only thing that
has changed in the last fifteen years is that middle-class men now think they do more
housework); FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES, NO FAMILIES?: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 111 (1991) (observing that when both spouses work
outside the home, "husbands do not step into the breach very often, if at all; employed wives
seem simply to add the demands of a job to their traditional responsibilities of running a
household"). In the words of the American Law Institute:
[D]espite the dramatic changes in the workforce participation of married women
over the last several decades, marital roles have persisted and their impact on the
work experiences of married women remains great.... Whether or not women
actually leave full-time employment after the birth of their children, studies
consistently show that they usually perform far more than half of the married couple's
domestic chores.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d (emphasis added).
52. Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 177, 182 n.21 (2000).
53. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 21 (1989).
54. Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 10-13.
55. DEBORAH L. RHODE,JUSTICE AND GENDER 174 (1989).
56. As the American Law Institute observed, "wives... in the great majority of cases...
sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for their children...." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §
5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c.
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1524 2004-2005
MOTHERS AS SUCKERS
A caretaker's market disinvestment may take several forms. She may
forego paid employment altogether, serving as a full-time homemaker (a
Betty Crocker); she may combine primary caretaking responsibilities with
paid employment (a Soccer Mom); or she may sequence full-time and part-
time homemaking, periodically dropping out of the job market to care for
young children or elderly parents (a Gapper). This is no fiction; these
mothers and the market losses they experience are real.
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that although their ranks may be
shrinking, a significant number of mothers continue to work as full-time
Betty Crockers, especially when their children are young.7 In 2003, 39% of
married women with children under age six were not employed in the
market at all, an increase over 2002 figures. 58 Over 47% of married mothers
with children less than one year old were not in the labor force in 2003, a
1.8 percentage point increase from 2002.59 In fact, labor force participation
of married mothers of children under age one has fallen every year since
1998.60
While married women with older children are more likely to work
outside their homes, a surprisingly large number of these mothers make
caretaking their full-time job. In 2003, over 23% of married women with
children between ages 6 and 17 worked exclusively in their homes. 6' Betty
Crocker, it seems, is no dinosaur. Recent reports of an opt-out revolution of
middle-class women who are choosing full-time caretaking 6' suggest she may
not soon disappear.
57. Two recent surveys suggest cultural ambivalence toward working mothers with young
children. A 2002 survey found that 48% of Americans believe preschool-age children "suffer" if
their mothers work. JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 29, at 54 (citing NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH
CTR., GEN. SOC. SURVEY, 1972-2000: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK (2002)). A 1999 survey found that
42% of employed parents are "concerned that many working mothers care more about
succeeding at work than meeting their children's needs." Id
58. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF
FAMILIES IN 2003, thl. 4 (2004) [hereinafter BLS 4/04], available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/famee.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
Based on 1999 data, Ann Crittenden reported that 6.9 million women (28.4% of married
women between ages 25 and 54 with children under age 18) worked exclusively in their homes.
CRITrENDEN, supra note 2, at 17, 277 n.4 (citing unpublished March 1999 Current Population
Survey).
59. BLS 4/04, supra note 58, at tbl. 4.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42;
see also Maggie Mahar, A Fiery Female Response; Howls of Protest Aside, Figures Suggest Many American
Women are 'Goin'Home" BARRON'S, Sept. 12, 1994, at 14 (stating that "[a]fter three decades of
growth, labor force participation by women appears to be slowing, with Generation X driving
the trend").
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Soccer Moms6' are also real. Many married women combine mothering
tasks with market employment, working two shifts-the first in the public
sphere and a second in the private sphere.64 Soccer Moms may devote fewer
hours to paid employment than non-mothers, 65 bring less energy to the
job,66 be more willing to take time off to tend to family needs or activities,
67
and acquire less education, experience, and job tenure than non-mothers. 6
Soccer Moms often occupy traditionally female jobs in the secondary market
where wages are low and opportunities for advancement are limited. 9 As
Congress recognized in the Family and Medical Leave Act, a caretaker's
home responsibilities often impact her market work.
70
63. Susan Casey coined the term "soccer mom" in her 1995 campaign for Denver City
Council. See Christopher Cox, Original Soccer Mom Spurs Kick, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 24, 1996, at
1. As Casey explained:
We arrange our lives around our kids and support them .... I wanted people to
understand that. I've been a teacher, I have a Ph.D., I've managed national
presidential campaigns, but when I wake up in the morning and when I go to bed
at night, my heart and soul are in my family.
id.
64. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 53.
65. "In 1996, for example, married working mothers on average put 1,197 hours into their
paying jobs, a mere half of the 2,132 hours averaged by married fathers." CRIITENDEN, supra
note 2, at 18. Based on 2000 data, Jacobs and Gerson reported that the mean weekly workload
of employed husbands was 45 hours, as compared with 36.6 hours for employed wives. JACOBS &
GERSON, supra note 29, at 44-45. While the birth of children decreases the number of hours
wives work, it slightly increases the number of hours husbands work. In 2000, wives with three
or more children worked 5.6 fewer hours per week than wives without children, while husbands
with three or more children worked 0.7 hours per week more than husbands without children.
Id. at 49.
66. Mothers who juggle home and market labor may be less productive on the job because
they spend less of their non-employment time in leisure than non-mothers. Avellar & Smock,
supra note 35, at 598-99.
67. Working women are more likely than working men to stay home when a child is sick
or when child-care plans break down.JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 29, at 90.
68. See Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, supra note 23, at 5-7.
69. Susan Faludi reports that "nearly 80 percent of working women [are] still stuck in
traditional 'female' jobs-as secretaries, administrative 'support' workers and salesclerks."
FALUDI, supra note 51, at xiii. Vicki Schultz has recentiy argued that women's lower pay in
relation to men is due to job segregation and pay discrimination rather than to family
responsibilities, which may be a consequence of job segregation, rather than its cause. Schultz,
supra note 10, at 1895-96. Female-dotiinated jobs, such as clerical, sales and health-care work,
are typically less flexible than those in male-dominated occupations. JACOBS & GERSON, supra
note 29, at 102. Part-time work may be a partial answer to the need for flexibility. As Jacobs and
Gerson note, "[p]art-time work is, almost by definition, more flexible" than full-time work. Id.
70. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2000) (finding that "the
primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects
the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of men"). As the Census
Bureau observed in 1986, many women "choose work that will fit around.., their family
responsibilities, a complication and impediment to occupational advancement not faced by
1526 [20051
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Gappers are also real. Elaine Sorensen reported that over 84% of the
female work force between ages 35 and 41 have periodically dropped out of
the labor market.7' In their study of Gappers, Jacobsen and Levin found that
the average length of the final employment gap for women in the 1980s was
7.5 years (though the median was 4.5 years),72 and that these women never
fully rebounded to the earnings levels of non-Gappers, even 20 years after
their last employment gap.'3
Whatever the extent and duration of a mother's market disinvestment,
employers are not likely to view her as an "ideal worker."74 Whether she is a
Betty Crocker, a Soccer Mom or a Gapper, a mother's work for the family is
likely to negatively impact her ability to earn market wages. How is the law to
deal with the reality that mothering is not free? One possibility is to craft
divorce reforms based on the notion that principles of fairness entitle
mothers to reparations for their losses. Another possibility is to recognize
that the costs of mothering underscore the necessity of legal intervention at
divorce, and then to craft divorce reforms that recognize mothers' status as
equal stakeholders in marriage, entitled to share family gains.
Unfortunately, the ALI adopts the first approach, emphasizing mothers'
losses rather than their contributions.
II. PROTECTING MARITAL CASUALTIES: THE ALI MODEL
The ALI's response to the costs of mothering is a new alimony model
that casts mothers as casualties of marriage entitled to compensation for
their economic loss. Notwithstanding its concession that quantifying loss
poses intractable problems, the Institute insists on a view of mothers as
victims of misfortune (market disinvestment) rather than purveyors of a
necessary good (family caretaking).
most men." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, ser. P-23, No. 146, at 7 (1986).
71. ELAINE SORENSEN, EXPLORING THE REASONS BEHIND THE NARROWING GENDER GAP IN
EARNINGS 3 (1991); see also Avellar & Smock, supra note 35, at 598-99 (finding that mothers
who undertake both home and market labor have more sporadic participation in the labor
market than men). Gaps in employment may be long or short-term and may involve job
termination or temporary separations, including maternity leave. As Jacobs and Gerson note,
even women who take advantage of family-supportive policies may face career risks. JACOBS &
GERSON, supra note 29, at 111.
72. Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 42, at 16.
73. Id at 15; see discussion supra Part I.A.
74. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at I (describing a deeply entrenched, gender-based system
of "domesticity," consisting of an ideal worker, "who works full time and overtime and takes
little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing," and a marginalized caregiver who
supports his ideal worker status).
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A. A CONCEPTUAL INNOVA TION: COMPENSATING Loss
In a "principal conceptual innovation," the ALI dramatically
recharacterizes alimony as "compenSation for loss rather than relief of need."
75
Need, explains the Institute, actually "results from the unfair allocation of
the financial losses arising from the marital failure."76 The Institute thus
proposes that loss be recognized and allocated according to "equitable
principles."7 7 In implementing its loss-allocation model, the ALI identifies
two primary types of compensable loss. 78 First, under section 5.04, a spouse
75. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. a (emphasis added). The ALI notes that
while the Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a loss-based model, no American authority of
similar stature has done so. Id § 5.02 reporter's notes cmt. a. Accompanying the new ALI model
is a new name for alimony-"compensatoy payments." Id. Basing alimony on loss rather than
need, reasons the Institute, "transforms" an alimony petition from a "plea for help" to a "claim
of entitlement." Id. Another view of this shift from need to loss, however, is that it transforms
mothers from beggars to victims. See Starnes, supra note 4, at 140-42.
Curiously, the ALI also claims that its new loss-allocation model is "less the alteration
of existing practices than the explanation of them." ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. a.
Each of its "categories of compensable loss," adds the Institute, "approximate fact patterns that
typically support alimony claims in existing law." Id. § 5.03 cmt. c. Actually, the Institute's claim
that it is mirroring current practice is curious in view of its earlier observation that alimony
decisions "vary widely, even within the saine jurisdiction" depending as they do on judicial
discretion. Id at Intro. cat. b. Judges, notes the Institute, apply "different principles as often as
they face different facts." Id.
76. Id. § 5.02 cmt. a.
77. Id § 5.02(1). A guiding principle in allocating loss, says the Institute, is "[t]he primacy
of the income earner's claim to benefit from the fruits of his or her own labor, as compared to
claims of a former spouse." Id. § 5.02(3) (d). This principle is an unfortunate reminder of the
old common law rule that property ordinarily belongs only to the spouse who earns it and not
to a dependent wife. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 284-86
(4th ed. 2004). While no state now expressly follows this traditional common law rule at
divorce, the rule may rear its ugly head as a divorce judge, vested with broad discretion,
searches for a starting point for the equitable division of marital property. See id. Joan Williams
argues that divorce law still follows this common law rule by generally treating a husband's wage
as his sole property. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 115.
78. The two awards described here are located in Topic 2. Topic 2 awards may be
combined, but the combined award may not exceed a cap to be set by state rulemakers. ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.10(2) (d). Topic 2 also sets out a third compensable loss in the case
of a claimant who has cared for a third party in fulfillment of a moral obligation owed by both
spouses. Id. § 5.11. The third person who receives care under section 5.11 will often be an
elderly parent, a storyline that may occur with increasing frequency in a population with
increasing longevity. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 29, at 83 (reporting that 35 million
Americans were aged 65 or older in 2000, a number expected to reach over 80 million by
2050). Those who care for the elderly are disproportionately female. In a 1997 study, 11% of
working women reported that they provided care to an elderly or dependent adult, as
compared with 7.4% of working men. Id at 95-96. Because section 5.11 is very similar to the
section 5.05 rule on caretakers of children and, even with the increasing population of elders, is
sure to cover far fewer cases, this Article will focus on section 5.05.
The Principles propose two additional types of compensatory spousal payments in
Topic 3. These awards are based on rescission and restitution and will be available to a much
smaller group of claimants than their Topic 2 counterparts. SeeALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §§
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may partially recover for loss of the marital living standard if her spouse's
earning capacity is "significantly greater" than her own, and the marriage is
of "sufficient" duration. 7 "The basis for the award," explains the Institute, "is
disproportionate vulnerability to the financial consequences of divorce." 80 As
an example of such vulnerability, the Institute cites the case of the
traditional wife whose "economic dependence... grows as the marriage
ages."8 ' Compensation for this wife is appropriate, explains the Institute,
since "[tio leave the financially dependent spouse in a long marriage
without a remedy would facilitate the exploitation of the trusting spouse and
discourage domestic investment by the nervous one.", 2 Disparate financial
vulnerability is thus the eligibility requirement of section 5.04,83 which
intervenes to protect the economic losers in marriage. Conspicuously absent
from this theme is any notion that such vulnerable persons are entitled not
just to equitable relief for their afflictions, but rather to an affirmative return
on their work as full stakeholders in marriage.84 The Institute's next alimony
section does no better.
Under section 5.05, a primary caretaker is entitled to support if her
earning capacity at divorce is "substantially less" than that of her spouse.5
5.12-5.14 (describing the two types of compensation payments "not based on the parties'
disparate financial capacity" as "compensation for contributors to the other spouse's
education," and "restoration of premarital living standards after a short marriage").
79. Section 5,04(1) provides:
A person married to someone with significantly greater wealth or earning capacity
is entitled at dissolution to compensation for a portion of the loss in the standard
of living he or she would otherwise experience, when the marriage was of sufficient
duration that equity requires that some portion of the loss be treated as the
spouses' joint responsibility.
The Institute recommends that state rulemakers implement this model by creating a
presumption of entitleient "in marriages of specified duration and spousal-income disparity."
Id. § 5.04(2).
80. Id. § 5.05 cmt. e.
81. Id. § 5.04 cmt. c. The Institute adds that "whether a financially dependent wife has
unrealized earning potential or not her sense of financial loss at divorce typically increases with
the marriage's duration .... " Id. In an effort at gender neutrality, the Institute notes that
"[a]lthough the rationale... has its most persuasive application to the case that conforms to
the historical pattern in which wives were financially dependent upon their husbands, it also
applies to marriages in which the husband is financially dependent upon his wife." Id.
82. Id.
83. Parenthood is thus not a prerequisite to a section 5.04 recovery.
84. For a proposal based on such stakeholder status, see discussion infra Part III.
85. Section 5.05(1) provides:
A spouse should be entitled at dissolution to compensation for the earning-
capacity loss arising from his or her disproportionate share during marriage of the
care of the marital children, or of the children of either spouse.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 505.1(x).
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Caretaking responsibilities, observes the Institute, often limit market labor
and "typically result.., in a residual loss in earning capacity that continues
after the children no. longer, require close parental supervision."86 Noting
the "strong persistence in traditional marital roles," the Institute concludes
that "wives continue, in the great majority of cases, to sacrifice earnings
opportunities to care for their children, in reliance upon continued market
labor by their husbands." 7 Like section 5.04, the rationale of section 5.05 is
based on the notion that mothers deserve protection88 because they are
economic losers in marriage.
Curiously, the Institute signals a serious underestimation of the
significance of its extensive rhetoric of economic vulnerability and loss, by
rather casually suggesting that the "choice of language is of course less
important than the underlying rule it describes." 9 This is not so. Language
can have a powerful effect on the way mothers view themselves and are
viewed by others. Cast as casualties of marriage under the ALI approach,
The Institute recommends that state rulemakers create a presumption of entitlement
to a section 5.05 award when:
(a) there are or have been marital children, or children of either spouse;
(b) while under the age of majority the children have lived with the claimant...
for a minimum period specified in the rule; and
(c) the claimant's earning capacity at dissolution is substantially less than that of
the other spouse.
Id. § 505.2.
86. !d. § 5.05 cmt. a.
87. Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c. Regarding the share of domestic chores women
perform, the Institute states:
Whether or not women actually leave full-time employment after the birth of their
children, studies consistently show that they usually perform far more than half of
the married couple's domestic chores. For this reason, the birth of children usually
affects the earning capacity of women who continue to work full time as well as
those who do not.
Id, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d.
88. Curiously, while both sections 5.04 and 5.05 speak of "entitlements" to compensation
for loss, payments under both sections terminate automatically if a spouse remarries. Id. §§ 5.04,
5.05, 5.07. Since "[a] bout 75 percent of all divorced women eventually remarry," this automatic
termination rule impacts the vast majority of divorcing women who receive alimony. Id. § 5.06
reporter's notes cmt. c. Elimination of loss clearly does not explain this rule, for the financial
impact of remarriage is usually irrelevant to alimony termination. Surely the rationale is not
that a woman now belongs to another man who has responsibility for her, a Cinderella-notion
more consistent with coverture than with entitlement. For a discussion of the remarriage
penalty, see Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition and the Remarriage-Termination
Rule, IND. L.J. (forthcoming).
89. ALI PRINCIPUS, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. a. This comment appears in the objectives
section of the Principles, as part of its comparison of a loss-based model to models based on
expected benefits. Evidently, the Institute's dubious point is that if loss and benefits models
achieve the same dollars and cents results, the choice of models is relatively unimportant.
(200511530
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mothers may deserve pity and even compensation, but they are denied the
status of full stakeholders in marriage entitled to dignity and a share of
marital gain. The Institute's loss-based rationale is problematic not only for
the dispiriting message it sends, but also for the intractable quantification
problems it faces.
B. "INTRACTABLE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS"
AND QUANTIFICATION ACCOMMODATIONS
After establishing loss as an eligibility requirement for alimony, the
Institute sets out to quantify alimony by measuring a claimant's loss. In a
surprising move, the Institute reasons that since loss is just the flip side of
gain, 90 loss of the marital living standard under section 5.04 can be
measured by calculating the disparity in the spouse's post-dissolution
expected earnings. Section 5.04(3) so quantifies loss "by applying a specified
percentage to the difference between the incomes the spouses are expected
to have after dissolution. "91 The Institute thus frankly co-opts the
mathematics of the expectation models it shuns.
In quantifying loss under section 5.05, the Institute again resorts to
expectation measures as a necessary concession to the near impossibility of
measuring actual loss. The Institute concedes "two intractable practical
problems in implementing the principle that both spouses should share in
the earning-capacity loss" of a primary caretaker under section 5.05.92 The
first problem lies in the difficulty of calculating the actual lost earnings
caused by primary caretaking. Such a calculation would compare "an
individual's actual earning capacity with the hypothetical earning capacity of
the same person" who was not a primary caretaker. 93 But how are legal actors
to know what a mother's earning capacity would have been had she made
90. The Institute thus notes that "a principle that compensates a spouse for loss of the
marital living standard could instead be said to protect the gain in living standard that that
spouse obtained from the marriage." Id.
91. Id. § 5.04(3). The Institute thus measures a spouse's loss by measuring the disparity in
expected spousal incomes. The Institute specifically rejects, however, a full expectation model
based on contribution, reasoning that although as a "general proposition" homemakers
contribute to their spouse's success, such contributions do not always enhance the other
spouse's earnings and, even when they do, establishing the causal connection between
contribution and success is difficult. Id. § 5.04 reporter's notes cmt. b. The Institute offers two
explanations for rejection of the expectation-based contract models offered by numerous
commentators: (1) "contract principles allow an expectation award only against a party in
breach," which the Institute deems inconsistent with no-fault divorce, and which would
sometimes place a homemaker in breach; and (2) "a conventional contract rationale would
require describing the spousal relation in exchange terms that seem inapt." d § 5.04 cmt. b.
For an argument that contract generally and partnership in particular offer useful models for
divorce, see discussion infra Part III.
92. Id. § 5.05 cmt. d.
93. Id
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"different life choices"? Any attempted quantification of hypothetical
earning capacity will almost always be exceedingly speculative.
94
The second problem, says the Institute, involves preparatory behavior-
"[e]arning-capacity losses [that] arise from the expectation that one will in
the future have primary responsibility for marital children. "95 To take a
simple example, the high school student who neglects her studies because
she plans to keep house rather than join the labor force, engages in
preparatory behavior that diminishes her opportunity for admission to
Harvard and perhaps for a successful career in business.96 The Institute
seems troubled by the possibility that a future spouse might compensate this
- 97
woman for her costly high school decision to forego her studies. Finding
"no satisfactory solution" to the problems of either preparatory behavior or
calculation of hypothetical earnings, the Institute concedes that "the basic
principle-that the residual loss in earning capacity arising from child-care
responsibilities should be shared-cannot be perfectly expressed in an
administrable rule."98 Quantification of loss, said the Institute, thus requires
"pragmatic accommodation. "99
As an initial accomm3dation, the Institute determines that although
"not entirely consistent with the section's basic rationale," the law should
simply assume, without proof, that when a primary caretaker's earnings are
"substantially less than those of her spouse,"'0 0 the explanation is the
caretaker's home labor.""i Because "fewer errors may be made by assuming
that all primary caretakers incur an earning-capacity loss than by attempting
to ascertain the loss in each case," 10 2 the Institute creates an irrebutable
94. "An accurate measure of the earning-capacity loss," reasons the Institute, "would
require a determination of what the claimant's earning capacity would have been if he or she
had not, and had never intended to, provide the major portion of parental care for the marital
children. Accurate measurements based on that hypothetical possibility are not ordinarily
available." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 cnt. e.
95. Id. § 5.05 cmt. d. "Economists clearly believe that women's incomes are affected not
only by their actual responsibility for the care of children but also by their expectations that
they will have this responsibility, which leads some to 'under-invest' in their own education and
training." Id, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d.
96. It is possible of course to trace preparatory behavior to the very early point at which
women's indoctrination into the sex/gender system begins, which encourages "choices" that
make a woman economically dependent on her husband and thus vulnerable to divorce. Of
course, this tracing would seriously undermine the Institute's rationale for compensatory
payments and thus allow a windfall for the husband who benefited from his wife's caretaking.
97. In the Institute's words, the question is whether 'higher hypothetical earning capacity
should be based on assumptions of more market-oriented behavior before the marriage as well
as after it." Id. § 5.05 cmt. d.
98. Id.
99. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. d.
100. Id. § 5.05 (2) (c).
101. Id. § 5.05 cmt. d.
102. Id. (emphasis added). "This section thus allows claims for all primary caretakers whose
earning capacity at dissolution is significantly less than their spouse's, but not otherwise. While
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presumption that when spousal earnings are substantially disparate, a
primary caretaker's lower earnings resulted from her home labor. 103
Quantifying a caretaker's presumptive loss then requires an additional
accommodation, which the Institute terms "an approximate proxy measure
of loss."' °4 This proxy measure presumptively calculates loss based on "the
difference in the spouses' expected post-dissolution earnings" multiplied by
a percentage based on the duration of child care. 0 5 Like the formula for
measuring lost marital standard of living in section 5.04, this formula
purports to quantify loss by quantifying expected benefit, again placing the
Institute in the awkward position of invoking the mathematics of the
expectations models they reject.
The Institute offers three justifications for resorting to measures of
expected gain in order to calculate loss under section 5.05. First, they claim
that basing compensation on the disparity in spousal earnings is actually a
good proxy for earning capacity loss, since statistics suggest that spouses are
more "similar in socioeconomic status" than "randomly chosen pairs of
people."06 Thus, reasons the Institute, a mate's earnings approximate what a
primary caretaker's earnings would have been but-for caretaking. Second, an
expectation formula compensates a primary caretaker's lost opportunity "to
have had children with someone with whom she would enjoy an enduring
relationship,",0 7 evidently again on the theory that a hypothetical, more-
enduring mate would have earning capacity much like her husband's,
which, but-for caretaking, would have been her own earnings. Finally, and
most curiously, the Institute reasons that their proxy measure compensates
loss by "providing a more balanced allocation at dissolution of the benefits
created by both spouses' contributions to the marriage."' ° That is, the
Institute's proxy measure of loss is more attractive because it apportions
expected marital benefits... like expectation models. Surprisingly, the
Institute then offers a one-paragraph classic expectation rationale,
this rule is not entirely consistent with the section's basic rationale, it is as close as is
administratively practical, and consistent with prevailing law." Id.
103. Id. As the Institute explains, the reasons for this rule are "partly pragmatic, and arise
from the difficulty of establishing what an individual's earning capacity would have been had
the individual made different life choices years earlier." Id. A spouse may, however, avoid
payments under section 5.05 by convincing a court that the claimant was not a primary
caretaker, for example, that she "did not provide substantially more than half of the total care
that both spouses together provided for the children." Id. § 5.05(3); see also id. § 5.05 cmt. d.
104. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. e.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. "The most direct measure of her financial loss would compare her situation at
divorce to the hypothetical situation had she married a different man. For this claimant, the
measure employed by this section is a reasonably equitable substitute, and far more practical."
Id.
108. Id. This rationale, says the Institute, "does not assume the claimant suffered an
earning-capacity loss, and.., therefore does not suggest a remedy measured by it." Id.
1533
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emphasizing parents' joint responsibility for children and the contributions
of primary caretakers, and suggesting that the primary caretaker has a claim
to a wage earner's post-divorce earnings.""' Of course, this rationale has
nothing to do with loss. The Institute recognizes as much, noting that
benefits-based proposals reach "very similar conclusions," at least in cases of
long-term marriages. 1 °
Something is amiss. After insisting that a loss-based rationale is superior
to an expectatiofi rationale, the Institute concedes the impossibility of
quantifying loss, resorts to an expectation formula, and then touts its loss-
based model for achieving an expectation remedy. The circularity is
unmistakable. One wonders why the Institute insisted on a loss rationale in
the first place, if an expected-benefits rationale would avoid the intractable
problems of quantification of loss and support the same mathematical
model, without assigning mothers the pitiable status of losers. Fortunately,
there is an escape from the negative normative message of the Institute's
rationale and the pragmatic problems of loss quantification.
III. DEPATHOLOGIZING MOTHERHOOD: THE PARTNERSHIP METAPHOR
Even as language can convey a dispiriting message of incapacity and pity
about mothers, it can also convey an affirmative message of empowerment
and dignity. A partnership model of marriage conveys the latter message,
offering a vocabulary and concept that cast mothers as full stakeholders in
marriage, equal in status to fathers, regardless of who brings home the
bigger paycheck. Partnership provides an alternative reform discourse, free
from the stubborn remnants of old ideologies that sabotage reform efforts
long after they are spoken in polite society. Under partnership, the equality
of husbands and wives-in contribution, in responsibility, in right-thus
109. As the Institute explains this rationale
By fulfilling their joint responsibility for their children's care, the claimant under
this section has allowed the other parent to have a family while also developing his
or her earning capacity. At dissolution, the primary wage earner retains both that
earning capacity and the parental status, while in the absence of any remedy the
primary caretaker loses any claim upon the other spouse's earnings. The result is
that, while the primary caretaker's contribution to the marital endeavor-
children-remains shared after the dissolution, the primary wage earner's
contribution-financial support-reverts entirely to him or her in the absence of
any remedy.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. e. Although it adheres to its loss-based rationale,
language that could be used to support an expected-benefits rationale appears sporadically in
the Institute's commentary. See, e.g., id § 5.05 cmt. a ("[C]ost is ordinarily incurred in the
expectation that ... the primary caretaker will continue to share in the income of the other
parent."); see also discussion infra Part III.
110. Id. § 5.04 reporter's notes cmt. c.
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becomes an analytical starting point for reform"' and a default position
when reform fails, but never a combat goal. But all this supposes partnership
is a good fit for marriage. Is it?
A. PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
Partnership offers an intuitive metaphor for marriage. In both principle
and practice, partnership and marriage have much in common. Both are
consensual relationships 12 that typically begin with the exchange of
commitments, often without written agreement or legal advice." 3 Both often
involve specialization, with one party primarily contributing money, and the
other primarily services, 1 4 a practice that describes both the traditional
marriage and many contemporary ones between primary breadwinners and
primary caregivers.
Expectations of gain, broadly understood, generally motivate both
partners and spouses to enter the relationship"15 In marriage, anticipated
gain may be emotional, spiritual and sexual as well as economic, but in some
way, couples ordinarily expect that marriage will make life better, a hope
evident in the celebration that commonly accompanies marriage. As
Elizabeth Scott observes, marrying couples are often motivated by self-
interest, each believing that "individual self-fulfillment will be promoted by a
substantial investment in a stable, interdependent, long-term relationship
111. As some marital property litigants have learned, the analytical starting point can be
determinative. See, e.g., Luedke v. Luedke, 476 N.E.2d 853, 865 (Ind. App. 1985) (finding that
the trial court abused its discretion in dividing property and that equitable distribution requires
a 50/50 starting point), rev'd, 487 N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ind. 1985) (holding that no statutory
language requires a 50/50 starting point).
112. See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND LLCs 194 (2d ed. 2002)
(noting that "the law has always considered a partnership to be a consensual relationship").
113. See ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND
ANALYSIS 18 (4th ed. 1987) ("The great mass of ordinary partnerships are probably in that form
because the parties never gave their organizational structure much attention. Their agreements
are informal, and often unwritten."); KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 7.2.1 (stating that some
partnerships "arise from a handshake").
114. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 8.1 ("A partnership obtains both labor and capital
from its partners, although not every partner necessarily provides both."). See generally ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 13.3.4 (1989).
115. Anticipated gain is a key characteristic of a partnership, which the UPA defines as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 6.1, 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001) [hereinafter UPA] (emphasis added). The UPA has undergone
several revisions since its promulgation by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1914. KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, at 190. The most recent revision,
published in 1997, is often referred to as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. REVISED UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001) [hereinafter RUPA]. At least thirty states have adopted the RUPA,
repealing the UPA. Id. See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001); WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 174
(3d ed. 2001).
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with a marital partner.""6 Similarly, couples may believe that "having and
raising children together in a loving home is important to self-realization.""
7
While the nature of expected gain in marriage is surely more personal, more
intimate, and more complex than in a commercial partnership, an
expectation of some type of gain describes both relationships.l"
8
Most compelling, however, is the normative appeal of partnership. The
"ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partnerships between
spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and risks."" 9 Much of the
attraction of partnership thus lies in its egalitarian principles of mutual
contribution, reciprocal responsibility, and shared fate-principles that
infuse family norms if not family realities. Absent agreement otherwise,
"[e]ach partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the
partnership business" 2 "; a rule consistent with modem equality rhetoric and
with community property law. Not unlike spouses, partners have "the right
to know what is going on in the partnership, the right to be involved in
conducting the business, the right to commit the partnership to third
parties, the right to participate in decision making, and the right to veto
certain decisions." 2 Partners also undertake a duty of loyalty 2 and of good
116. Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 12
(1990). Scott contrasts this view of marriage with the "conventional 'story' of modern marriage
[as] one of limited investment and individual pursuit of self-gratification, followed by
disappointment and the breakdown of the relationship." Id. at 11.
117. Id. at 12.
118. For a suggestion that business partners may also seek a form of psychic benefit, see
CONARDETAL., supra note 113, at 17:
One of the outstanding features of the organizational revolution is the impulse of
people to join in common endeavors. This impulse is commonly attributed to the
desire to pool money, resources, skills, and intelligence for greater achievements;
it may also respond to some less rational need for affiliation or psychic
reinforcement. Modern laws generously provide convenient receptacles for these
efforts, by way of corporations for business, religious, eleemosynary, educational or
social purposes. However, millions of people continue to pool their resources
through less formal, or substantially unstructured groups. Of these, the best known
to the law is the ordinary partnership.
119. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 198 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990)
[hereinafter DIVORCE REFORM]. For a commentary on the partnership model of marriage, see
generally Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of
Self Over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REv. 59 (2001).
120. RUPA, supra note 115, § 401(f).
121. KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 9.1.
122. RUPA, supra note 115, § 404(a), (b). In a passage often quoted in partnership law,
Justice Cardozo describes the fiduciary duty of loyalty in ajoint venture:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
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faith and fair dealing toward each other, 12 obligations consistent with social
norms of mutual trust and responsibility between spouses. Partners also
share equally all profits and losses,2 4 a principle that tends to encourage
partners "to view their economic fate as linked with the fate of the enterprise
as a whole."12 5 A similar sense of shared fate is inherent in normative
concepts of egalitarian marriage.' 26 The distinction between status as a
partner and status as a mere participant such as a wage earner is significant:
a partner participates in important decisions, while a wage earner obeys
instructions; a partner contributes property while a wage earner merely
works in the business; a partner may agree to share losses while a wage
earner is not affected by loss.
121
It would be foolish, of course, to insist that partnership perfectly
describes marriage. The question, however, is not whether anyone would
mistake a business partnership for a marriage, but rather whether any gain
can flow from an analogy to partnership. Such an analogy need not be an
all-or-nothing proposition, for partnership can inform discourse without
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
123. RUPA, supra note 115, § 404 (d). This section provides: "A partner shall discharge the
duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing." Rd See generally KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 9.8.4. The good faith obligation is "a
contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature of the
partnership." RUPA, supra note 115, § 404 cmt. 4. Partner selfishness is not allowed unless the
other partners consent. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 9.8.3.
124. See RUPA supra note 115, § 401 (b) ("Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the
partnership profits and is chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in proportion to the
partner's share of the profits.").
125. KLFINBERGER, supra note 112, § 7.2.3. Sharing profits (gross income less expenses)
tends to produce a different attitude than having a share of revenues (gross income). Id.
"Someone with a share merely of revenues tends to focus on making sales, worrying little about
the rest of the enterprise. For someone who shares profits, in contrast, sales (and revenues) are
only part of the equation; a profit will exist only if the whole business is functioning well." Id
Like business partners, spouses may view themselves as sharing not just paychecks, but ultimate
gains and losses.
126. As one court observed:
When couples enter marriage, they ordinarily commit themselves to an indefinite
shared future of which shared finances are a part. Acquisitions are made, foregone
or replaced for the good of the family unit rather than for the financial interests of
either spouse. Property is bought, sold, enhanced, diminished, intermixed and
used without regard to ease of division upon termination of the marriage. All this
may be modified by agreement, of course, but, by the nature of the marital
relationship, couples ordinarily pledge their troth for better or worse until death
parts them and their financial affairs are conducted accordingly.
In Marriage of Stice, 779 P.2d 1020, 1026-27 (Or. 1989) (quoting In re Marriage of Jenks, 656
P.2d 286, 290 (Or. 1982)).
127. KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 7.4.4.
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dominating it. 28 Much can indeed be gained from an analogy to
partnership, as the drafters of no-fault divorce laws understood.
B. NO-FAuLTDiVORCE: THE CEA4N-BRFAK PARTNERSHIP MODEL
Especially attractive to the drafters of the harbinger of no-fault divorce,
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), 125 was the historical
partnership principle of at-will dissolution, the unalterable power of a
partner to dissolve the partnership at any time. 30 This dissolution right is
the linchpin of no-fault divorce, which authorizes divorce at the will of either
party upon a finding that the marriage is "irretrievably broken." 13 1 Indeed,
the UMDA drafters went so far as to substitute the partnership term
"dissolution" for the more traditional term "divorce. " 13 UMDA drafters also
expressly adopted a partnership model for the division of marital
property, I1 3 recognizing that the power to dissolve the marriage does not
entitle a spouse to walk away from marriage without financial consequence,
an incident of cohabitation rather than marriage.
128. Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 84.
129. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 11 (1998) [hereinafter
UMDA]. Within five years after California enacted a no-fault divorce statute, most states
adopted at least one no-fault ground. Franklin E. Zimring, Foreward, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra
note 119, at vii. In 1985, South Dakota became the last state to adopt a no-fault divorce ground.
Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fiji States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L. Q.
369, 379 (1985). For a history of the no-fault movement, see Herma Hill Kay, Equality and
Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1987).
130. UPA, supra note 115, §§ 29, 31; see KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 11.2.1 ("For
centuries the law has characterized partnership as a voluntary arrangement, and a partner's
power to dissolve reflects and preserves that character.") RUPA carefully distinguishes a
partner's power to "dissociate" from a partnership from the dissolution of a partnership.
Compare RUPA, supra note 115, § 601, with RUPA, supra note 115, § 801. "An entirely new
concept, 'dissociation' is used in lieu of the UPA term 'dissolution' to denote the change in the
relationship caused by a partner's ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business."
Id. § 601 cmt. 1. For a discussion of dissociation and dissolution, see supra Part III.B.
131. The UMDA requires a court to enter a decree of dissolution of marriage if:
the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, if the finding is supported
by evidence that (i) the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more
than 180 days next preceding the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) there
is serious marital discord adversely affecting the attitude of one or both of the
parties toward the marriage ....
UMDA, supra note 129, § 302(a).
132. See id. §§ 302, 305.
133. In a prefatory note, the drafters state: "The distribution of property upon the
termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets
incident to the dissolution of a partnership." Id. at Prefatory Note. Consistent with partnership
principles, most divorce statutes return a spouse's separate property. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra
note 77, at 293-94. This divorce practice is analogous to the return of capital furnished (but not
contributed) to a business partnership. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 8.6.
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Unfortunately, while the UMDA's simple partnership model laudably
casts mothers as equal partners in marriage, it also promotes a clean-break
vision of divorce that imposes the costs of divorce disproportionately on
mothers. How did this come to be, in spite of the UMDA's noble effort to
frame laws on egalitarian partnership principles? The answer begins with
two borrowed partnership concepts: the right to dissolve a partnership at will
and the subsequent liquidation of partnership assets. The divorce model
based on these concepts empowers a spouse to dissolve a marriage at any
time without a showing of fault,'S and authorizes a court to divide marital
property in a one-time order that finally settles the parties' rights and
responsibilities. Central to this divorce scheme is the principle that spouses
deserve a clean break and a fresh start, an opportunity to begin life anew
without the lingering financial entanglement of a dead marriage. In
practice, this principle supports a final resolution of economic rights at
divorce through a one-time division of marital property and limited
opportunities for alimony.135 While this model initially held great appeal for
a variety of divorce reformers, 136 it is becoming evident that in the many
marriages in which property is insignificant,13 7 the practical effect of the
clean-break principle is to devastate long-term caretakers who are set free to
begin new lives with few resources, dated employment histories and limited
market skills."" Younger caretakers of minor children are also hard-hit by
134. See discussion supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
135. As the UMDA prefatory note explains, "the Act does not continue the traditional
reliance upon maintenance as the primary means of support for divorced spouses." UMDA,
supra note 129, at Prefatory Note. This comment is curious in view of the small number of
women who have ever received alimony. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Official
Comment to UMDA § 308 provides:
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 is to encourage the court to
provide for the financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than
by an award of maintenance. Only if the available property is insufficient for the
purpose and if the spouse who seeks mainteriance is unable to secure employment
appropriate to his skills and interests or is occupied with child care may an award
of maintenance be ordered.
UMDA, supra note 129, § 308.
136. The notion that a caretaker can be quickly rehabilitated appeals to caretaking women
wishing for financial independence, to feminists insisting women do not need male support, to
husbands hoping to avoid supporting their ex-wives, and to clean-break advocates seeking a
clear conscience. See Starnes, supra note 10, at 97-98.
137. See supra note 6.
138. For an early and caustic indictment of the impact of no-fault divorce on long-term
caretakers, see In re Marnage of Branter, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (1977) (stating that no-fault
divorce laws are not meant to serve as a "handy vehicle for the summary disposal of old and
used wives").
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the clean-break principle, as they are set free to begin new lives, not as ideal
workers, but as marginalized caregivers.
139
The problem with current law lies not in partnership, however, but in
the simplistic use of partnership principles. No-fault divorce laws fail to
recognize both the case in which partnership business continues after the
dissociation of a partner 14 and the critical distinction between dissolution,
windup and termination.41 The reform remedy that I propose in the next
section is not to scrap partnership, but to expand it; not to abandon the
powerful, egalitarian, gender-neutral principles that drew no-fault reformers
in the first place, but to enrich our understanding of those principles.
IV. PARTNERSHIP TOOLS FOR INCOME SHARING
They had trusted each other to the point that no one had ever raised the
prospect of a written partnership agreement let alone dissolution. But sitting
at the end of the conference table was one of the partners having just
announced that he wanted to dissolve the partnership and take his
considerable collection of contingency fee cases with him. The other partners
were stunned. Could he really expect to heep these cases and not share the
income realized from them e
42
Like spouses, business partners may begin their relationship as starry-
eyed optimists, full of hope and trust, eschewing the need for a written
prenuptial or partnership agreement. 14' Not until their relationship is in
jeopardy do partners begin to understand the mutual vulnerability inherent
in shared adventure. Strangely, the law of no-fault divorce seems to miss the
mutuality of marital partners' fate, instead implementing a partnership
model that places the costs of divorce primarily on one spouse-the female
caretaker. A more fully developed concept of partnership can do better,
providing a compelling rationale for buyout of a lower-income spouse and
income-sharing for a caretaker of minor children.
A. A MARtIAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL: DISSOCIATIONAND BUYOUT
Marriage is a lifetime commitment-from both a traditional and a
normative perspective, marriage is for life. 144 However, it is also a
139. The terms "ideal worker" and "marginalized caregiver" are borrowed from Joan
Williams. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 1.
140. See infra notes 150-54; see also Starnes, supra note 10, at 119-27.
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 157-65 and
accompanying text.
142. Mark I. Weinstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the
Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent Fee Cases and the No Compensation Rule, 33 DUQ. L.
REV. 857, 857 (1995).
143. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
144. As Elizabeth Scott notes, marrying couples want marriage to be binding:
[200511540
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commitment that spouses may break. Marriage serves an important social
function by enabling parties to tie themselves together in a significant and
formal, if intensely personal, relationship that family, friends and the public
at-large recognize as legally binding. Why would anyone do this? As
Elizabeth Scott observes, couples may believe their best hope for long-term
personal happiness lies in a lasting commitment to another person. 145 So,
too, may they believe that their children will benefit from a stable parental
relationship. Couples may thus not want to be free to succumb to
temptations that, while gratifying in the short-term, interfere with their
ultimate goal. And so, much like Ulysses asked his crew, couples ask the law
to bind them to the matrimonial mast.
46
No-fault divorce does not change this view of marriage. While marriage
licenses still do not designate a term other than life, everyone understands
that spouses are free to change their minds, to break their promises of
lifetime commitment at any time and for virtually any reason. High divorce
rates make it clear that many do indeed change their minds. Marriage,
however, need not be an inescapable commitment in order to be a lifetime
one. Even though divorce laws recognize spouses' freedom to end their
relationship, these laws do not change the terms of the initial marital
commitment any more than the ability to terminate a business contract
alters its initial terms. In neither case are parties compelled to specifically
perform their promises, nor are their broken promises penalized through
punitive damage awards. 1 47 The point is that breaking a promise is not the
Two people enter marriage committed to its success and endurance, though not,
as in the past, because of religious obligation or moral duty to the spouse. Rather,
each person determines that individual self-fulfillment will be promoted by a
substantial investment in a stable, interdependent, long-term relationship with a
marital partner. The couple also view having and raising children together in a
loving home as important to self-realization.
Scott, supra note 116, at 12.
145. Id. at 22 ("For many, the goal of self-fulfillment in marriage means substantial
investment in a long-term relationship, rather than short-term gratification and 'nonbinding
commitment.'").
146. See id. at 40 ("At least since Ulysses told his crew to tie him to the mast so that he would
not yield to the entreaties of the sirens ... people have used precommitment strategies as a
means of self-management.").
147. As Allan Farnsworth explains:
Somewhat surprisingly, our system of contract remedies rejects, for the most part,
compulsion of the promisor as a goal. It does not impose criminal penalties on one
who refuses to perform one's promise, nor does it generally require one to pay
punitive damages. Our system of contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of
promisors to prevent breach; it is aimed, instead at relief to promisees to redress breach.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTs § 12.1 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
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same as never having made one. No-fault divorce law allows parties to break
promises; it does not pretend promises were never made.
148
But if promises can be broken, what is the point of insisting they were
initially made? The answer is that freedom to terminate a relationship does
not necessarily mean freedom to terminate it without cost. To say marriage
may be dissolved upon request and without penalty is not to say it may be
dissolved without a price, by walking away with all the assets or income
accumulated during the marriage. Unlike cohabitation, which parties
traditionally may end without legal involvement or economic
consequence,14 9 marriage is a legal status, 50 which ends only with state
involvement and, absent agreement otherwise, with state determination of
the economic price of exit.''
So what is the exit price? Drawing on the imagery of Joan Williams,
152
the answer might begin with a view of marriage as a commitment to share,
among other things, the effort necessary to sustain and nurture the family.
In practice, this commitment often produces a family wage through the
combined efforts of one spouse who works in the market as an ideal worker,
and the other who works primarily in the home as a supporting caregiver.
15
1
At divorce, the spouses' sharing abruptly ends as the ideal worker's paycheck
148. Denial of the existence of marital promises is more consistent with an action for
annulment than for divorce.
149. Cohabiting parties may, of course, enter contracts creating enforceable rights, though
such contracts may be subject to scrutiny to which business contracts are not ordinarily subject.
See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (1976).
150. The UMDA addresses the old debate over whether marriage is a contract or status by
referencing marriage as a "personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a
civil contract to which the consent of the parties is essential." UMDA, supra note 129, § 201.
151. Parties can generally avoid this default rule by entering into a prenuptial agreement,
though few choose to do so.
152. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 1-9. Although Williams's imagery provides compelling
support for a partnership model of marriage, she rejects such a model as a "highly
commercialized" analogy that is "unconvincing" and "threatens intimate relations with
undesirable commodification." Id, at 135. To the contrary, the concepts and vocabulary of
partnership can help free reform discourse from habituated assumptions about family
entidements that sabotage efforts to make family law truly equitable. Escape from the discourse
of domesticity is a powerful step toward gender equity. For an argument that it is actually the
refusal to commodify women's labor that harms women, see infra notes 175-82 and
accompanying text.
153. Williams describes an entrenched gender system of "domesticity" characterized by,
first, "organization of market work around the ideal of a worker who works full time and
overtime and takes little or no time off for child bearing or child rearing" and, second, a
"system of providing for caregiving by marginalizing the caregivers." WILUAMs, supra note 7, at
1. Williams reasons that "the ideal worker's wage is the product of two adults: the ideal worker's
market work and the marginalized caregiver's family work." Id. at 5. Susan Okin has suggested
that a couple's "equal legal entitlement to all earnings coming into the household" could be
made clear by requiring employers to "make out wage checks equally divided between the
earner and the partner who provides all or most of his or her unpaid domestic services." OKiN,
supra note 10, at 180-81.
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is taken from the family and assigned to one spouse as his alone.
54
Conceptually, this is not a wholly inappropriate result, since to require
continued income sharing would be to require specific performance of the
promise of lifetime sharing, a result as inconsistent with understandings of
marriage and divorce as it is with understandings of contract. The question,
however, is not whether the law should require continued performance of
marital commitments, but rather whether it should impose a price for
broken commitments.
Elsewhere I have proposed a simple model that provides conceptual
support and numeric calculation of a marital exit price.155 Employing the
principles and language of partnership to escape lingering gender-biased
assumptions about family equity, I have suggested that a spouse whose
earnings disproportionately increase during marriage in relation to those of
his partner should be required to buy out her interest at divorce. This
marital exit price resembles the buyout required of a fixed-term partnership
that continues to operate after dissociation of a partner.156 The principle
underlying buyout is simple: when partnership contributions generate value,
i.e., enhance the ability of the partnership to generate future income, a
departing partner is entitled to a share of that value. Partners who elect to
continue what was once a shared effort are thus required to compensate a
departing partner.
Like commercial partners, spouses commonly pool their labor, time,
and talent to meet responsibilities and to generate income that they expect
to share. Consider, for example, the marriage of an ideal worker s7 and a
Soccer Mom. Together, these spouses contribute capital and labor to the
marital partnership in the expectation that their mutual contributions will
generate shared value in the form of income and a home with children.
Often, the spouses' combined efforts generate enhanced human capital
primarily for the husband who has invested more extensively in paid
158
employment than his primary caretaker spouse. In such a case, it is the
marital partnership, rather than the husband alone, that has produced the
husband's enhanced human capital. Although divorce terminates the
parties' relationship, it usually does not terminate the husband's income
stream, which continues to reflect the enhanced value produced through
154. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 3. "When two family members work together to produce an
asset," reasons Williams, "it makes no sense to award it unilaterally to one of them." Id. at 5.
155. See Starnes, supra note 10, at 119-27.
156. When a partner dissociates before the end of a fixed term, remaining partners may
elect to continue rather than wind up the partnership business. See RUPA, supra note 115, §
801 (2) (i). In such cases, the partners who continue the business must buy out the interest of
the dissociated partner. Id. § 701 (a).
157. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 1-6.
158. For a discussion of the market costs of primary caretaking, see discussion supra Part I.
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joint marital effort. Such a husband should therefore buy out the interest of
his wife at divorce.
To implement this model and to guard against its gender-biased
application, I have proposed bright-line legislation that presumptively
establishes: (1) a simple mathematical model for calculating enhanced
earnings, and (2) a sliding scale that bases the buyout price on the length of
the marriage. 159 While this buyout model addresses cases in which shared
efforts end with divorce, it does not address cases where the presence of
minor children requires the continuing, combined efforts of former
spouses. For these latter cases, I propose an additional, complementary
partnership model that should replace the ALI's model.
B. A PARENTING PARTNERSHIP MODEL:
CHILDREN AS UNFINISHED PARTNERSHIP BUSINEss
When marital partners are also parents, they implicitly undertake an
additional mutual commitment to support and nurture their children. This
parenting partnership complements but does not supplant the marital
partnership, which continues to define the couple's spousal relationship.
While no-fault divorce laws empower a spouse to divorce a co-parent during
their children's minority, they do not empower a parent to divorce her
child. Parental responsibility to children continues after divorce, normatively
and pragmatically linking divorced parents to each other as they continue to
support and nurture their children. Family law, however, generally ignores
the economic equities between divorced parents during their children's
minority, leaving the primary caretaker parent largely alone to bear the post-
divorce career costs of child rearing. ' Partnership remedies this inadequacy
in current law, providing a compelling model for economic equity between
divorced parents during their children's minority.16
159. Starnes, supra note 10, at 130-38. This buyout share, which increases with the length of
the marriage, might be patterned after the Uniform Probate Code provision for a gradually-
increasing forced share based on the length of the marriage. Id. at 136 n.309. Curiously, the
ALI, while rejecting a partnership model, notes that its "emphasis on duration of marriage .. is
consistent with the approach of the new [UPCI, which gradually enlarges the forced share in
proportion to the duration of the marriage." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.04 reporter's
notes cmt. c.
160. See generally Estin, supra note 10. The ALI's alimony proposal does not compensate
primary caretakers for lost earnings incurred because of post-divorce child care. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. f. While the Institute recognizes the reality of a caretaker's
continuing lost opportunities after divorce, they suggest that these losses are more
appropriately considered as part of a child support award. Id. The Institute's deference to child
support sends a disturbing message: A divorced caretaker's claim against her ex-husband
depends not on her status as an equal stakeholder in parenting, but rather on her status as an
appendage of a dependent child, from whom she may siphon support.
161. Other commentators have offered proposals for continued income sharing during the
minority of marital children. June Carbone, for example, suggests that divorce should be
irrelevant to the "economic community initiated by marriage [that] endures through the
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Partnership law recognizes that the departure of a partner does not
always trigger an immediate termination of the partnership. Even after a
partnership dissolves, it may continue to operate until its affairs are wound
up. 162 During windup, partners "complete the business of the partnership,
liquidate assets, settle liabilities, and distribute profits, if any, among the
partners." 163 Only after this process is complete does the partnership
terminate. The UPA thus recognizes a three-step process for ending a
partnership: dissolution, windup and termination.' 64
As partners wind up their affairs, they continue to be linked by mutual
• . 165
obligations and continue to share a fiduciary relationship. However
"strained" the relations between the partners may actually be,' 66 the UPA
views the process of winding up as a "cooperative venture." 67 During this
period, profits and losses are allocated to the former partners according to
their respective interests in the partnership;' 68 in the absence of an
agreement otherwise, they continue to share as equal partners."'
Additionally, in a change from prior law, the RUPA generally authorizes
children's minority, whatever happens to the parents' relationship." Carbone, supra note 10, at
387. Emphasizing parents' obligations to their children rather than to each other, Carbone
would equalize parents' standards of living during their children's minority. Id. Similarly, Judith
Younger has proposed a special status-"marriage for the benefit of minor children-that
would presumptively preclude divorce and thus continue income sharing during children's
minority. Judith Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 891, 900-14 (1992). While neither Carbone nor Younger endorse a partnership model,
the dollars and cents of their proposals are virtually identical to a proposal based on
partnership. Partnership offers the additional benefit of conceptual and linguistic escape from
habituated assumptions about gender roles and rights that impede efforts to achieve equity for
mothers.
162. See RUPA, supra note 115, § 802(a). See generally HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 115, at
703-05.
163. Weinstein, supra note 142, at 861.
164. As Professor Gregory explains:
Under the UPA, dissolution designates the point in time when the partners cease
to carry on the business together; in contrast, termination is the point in time
when all the partnership affairs have been wound up. Winding up is the period of
time subsequent to dissolution and prior to termination during which the process
of settling partnership affairs takes place.
GREGORY, supra note 115, § 227.
165. Weinstein, supra note 142, at 861-62.
166. Id. at 872.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 861 n.23 ("Profits or benefits derived from the unfinished business of a
partnership during the winding up period must be held in trust for the partnership.").
169. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (describing how partners share equally
in profits and losses).
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extra compensation for a partner who bears a disproportionate burden
during windup. 1
70
As an easy example of the UPA's three-step process, consider the case of
the law firm partnership. When a partner leaves the firm, the partnership
may dissolve, but the dissolution does not itself complete partnership work
on ongoing client cases, some of which may present valuable contingent fee
opportunities. These active cases constitute unfinished partnership business,
to be completed during the process of winding up the partnership. Only
upon completion of this unfinished business does the dissolved partnership
finally terminate.
Family law can gain much from a loose analogy to the partnership rules
on windup. When parents divorce during their children's minority, the
children represent unfinished work of the parenting partnership, to be
completed before that partnership terminates. 17 Though a divorcing spouse
may ardently wish to jettison the other parent from her life, this desire is
often inconsistent with normative views of children's best interests, 72 with
the pragmatics of child rearing and with the mathematics of child support.
But is parenting really a shared responsibility that survives divorce,
rather than the individual responsibilities of two independent persons?
Clearly, some divorced parents are more willing to coordinate their
caretaking and financial responsibilities than others. In the best-case
scenario, parents communicate amicably and work together to ensure that
their children receive appropriate physical, emotional and financial support.
But even between parents less inclined toward amicability, parents'
obligations are in many ways interdependent.
Child support offers a prime example of this interdependency. Under
the popular income-shares formula underlying many child support
guidelines, the amount of financial support a noncustodial parent must
contribute to a child's care generally depends not only on his income, but
also on the income that the custodial parent can contribute to the child's
170. This provision represents a change from the "no compensation rule" of prior law,
which denies a partner compensation for services performed for the partnership other than
reasonable compensation to a surviving partner. Weinstein, supra note 142, at 858 n.2.
171. Partners for a particular undertaking have the power to dissolve the partnership
before completion of the undertaking. KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 11.2.1. While the
parenting partnership can be viewed as a partnership for a particular undertaking (the rearing
of children to majority), an analogy to partnership rules permitting premature termination
does not fit well.with parenting, since terminating parents' responsibilities prior to children's
majority is inconsistent with normative concepts of parenting.
172. For an argument that "a coherent parental partnership ideal is the missing piece of
custodial jurisprudence," see June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New
Model of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1091, 1095 (1999).
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care.173 The mutuality of the parents' financial obligations is evident in such
a computation.
Parental duties to provide physical care for a child are even more
obviously interdependent. To the extent one parent satisfies legal thresholds
for a child's physical care, the other need not.174 A parent may, of course,
choose to provide additional care of some type and degree, but she is not
compelled to provide basic care, having been freed from legal compulsion
by the other parent's action. Similarly, when Parent A provides care that is
not legally required but that Parent B perceives as necessary from a social,
moral or religious perspective, Parent B is freed from the self-imposed
responsibility to provide that care.175 Examples of such parental
interdependency abound: to the extent one parent prepares a child's
dinner; wraps her in a winter coat; transports her to school or to piano
lessons or to the zoo; washes her underwear; or reads her a bedtime story,
the other parent need not do these things. While it may seem strange from a
normative perspective to think of parents as being "freed" from the need to
perform such acts, some of which may generate significant psychic benefit
for the parent who performs them, most parents also understand from a
practical perspective the value of occasional freedom from these
responsibilities. Weekend babysitters for pay understand this reality well
enough.
Even in a conventional, binary custodian/noncustodian divorce decree,
both parents thus typically continue to provide physical, emotional, financial
and perhaps spiritual care for their children in a way that is interdependent.
When divorce dissolves the parents' marriage, it does not ordinarily
terminate obligations of the parenting partnership, which continue during
the unfinished business of raising children.
What does this unfinished-parenting model offer divorce reformers? In
addition to injecting realism into the clean-break philosophy of no-fault
divorce, it provides a compelling basis for income-sharing during the
children's minority. Partnership rules on the economics of unfinished
business suggest two possible bases for such income-sharing: (1)
173. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 463-65. Actually, the purpose of
combining the parents' income "is not to assess the resources independently available to the
child in the residential household, but simply to execute the principle that the percentage of
income . . . payable as child support should be determined by and applied against the total
income of both parents." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, Intro. n. 27.
174. The ALl recognizes the mutuality of parental responsibilities during marriage, noting
"the spouses' special responsibility for the care of their children, which exists apart from any
agreement between them." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. a. While
parents "can allocate that responsibility.., they cannot avoid it and the spouse who assumes it
discharges a legal obligation of both parents." Id.
175, The ALI recognizes spouses' mutual moral responsibility for children. See id § 5.02
cmt. f (observing that while one spouse may primarily care for the children, "both spouses are
morally responsible" for that care).
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compensation for a disparately-burdened parent and (2) profit-sharing
between parents.
1. A Compensation Model
As the unfinished work of parenting continues after divorce, each
parent ordinarily contributes financially to the children's upbringing, in a
ratio and amount determined by child support guidelines. Yet dollars alone
do not satisfy parental responsibilities to children, who require physical care
as well as financial support. After divorce, one parent usually undertakes
primary responsibility for the children's daily physical care, often limiting
paid employment in order to meet this responsibility.'7 6 Were this custodial
parent a business partner undertaking the lion's share of unfinished
partnership work, she might receive compensation. Because she is a parent,
however, her disproportionate burden is ignored, a result that is as
inequitable for a parenting partner as it is for a business partner.
While partnership's "no-compensation rule" generally disallows wages
for the individual partner who performs partnership work, 77 the RUPA
recognizes that this rule can impose an unconscionable hardship on a
partner who undertakes a disproportionate share of unfinished partnership
business during windup.'78  The RUPA thus authorizes reasonable
compensation in such cases.179 This framework provides a model for
payments to a custodial parent who undertakes a disproportionate share of
the parenting partnership's unfinished daily work.
Such a compensation model, however, would require quantification of
the reasonable value of caretaking. Commodification critics argue that this is
crass, that monetizing home labor degrades and exploits women,180 implying
176. In about ninety percent of divorce cases, mothers receive primary physical custody of
children. ELLMAN FT AL., supra note 77, at 571-72. For a review of primary caretaking
responsibilities, see discussion supra Part I.B.
177. UPA, supra note 115, § 18(f); RUPA, supra note 115, § 401(h). These default rules may
be changed by agreement. See generally KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 8.5.
178. RUPA, supra note 115, § 401(h).
179, Id § 401(h) (stating that each partner is entitled to "reasonable compensation for
services rendered in winding up the business of the partnership"). Under the UPA, however,
reasonable compensation is available only to a sole surviving partner. UPA, supra note 115, §
18(f); see also KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 8.5 n.20.
180. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 75-81 (1993). As
Vicki Schultz notes, while "[n]o self-respecting feminist could be against 'valuing
housework'.., that slogan obscures a host of troubling institutional questions .... " Schultz,
supra note 10, at 1900. "[F]eminists," warns Schultz, "should be wary of paths to 'valuing
housework' that encourage women to concentrate on housework and childcare at the expense
of a deep commitment to paid work." Id, at 1911. Even apart from questions of the
appropriateness of Schultz's very negative view of caretaking as compared with paid labor, it is
not clear that post-divorce income-sharing would actually encourage increased caretaking labor,
especially in view of feminists' arguments that caretaking is less a choice than a practical
necessity. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 52, at 180 (noting "[t]he constraints on women's lives such
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their fungibility and erroneously supposing that there is a market price for
family-specific caretaking, an alternative provider of the loving nurture a
mother supplies.' 8 1 Moreover, say commodification critics, such market talk
raises the terrible specter of affect lost through habituated economic
discourse.""2
As Katharine Silbaugh poignantly observes, however, home labor is not
an either/or proposition, but rather a multifaceted activity capable of
"plural meanings. Homemaking has both an affective and an economic
component and is thus simultaneously priceless and capable of pricing.8
Neither does the absence of a real market for family-specific caretaking
preclude its valuation. There is no market for human arms or legs, yet a fact
finder may quantify a tort plaintiffs loss of a limb. 8 5 In such cases, the law
creates a rhetoric market as a necessary means of ensuring fair treatment for
identified parties. l 6 There are good reasons to create such a rhetoric market
for caretaking, for the law's refusal to value home labor serves largely "to
" 187leave women without cash in the name of non-commodification.
Assuming homemaking does indeed have plural meanings and that
such labor may be monetized without destroying its nonmonetized value,
how is the law to value it? Is it really possible to place a price tag on the vast
that they appear to choose a life of household duties and to conserve power within that sphere,
when, in fact, the choice is rigged").
181. This point is made byJames Boyd White:
The segmentation of the exchange model tends to misvalue the work we do for
ourselves, which is most of the traditional work of women .... This is especially
true of people who raise their own children. Such work cannot be segmented into
functions and then made the material of the market process, actual or
hypothetical, for what the child requires is the sustained presence of, and
interaction with, a loving and respectful person, something no alternative can
supply. Similarly, housework has a different meaning when one is maintaining
one's own home rather than acting as a servant for others.
White, supra note 12, at 190.
182. See MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1885 (1987).
183. Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 96-100. As Silbaugh observes: "The commodification
critique is often a conversation stopper. Because markets do not capture the entire experience
in question, they are thought to threaten the existence of what they cannot describe." Id. at 120.
184. Id. at 96. Placing a price tag on one aspect of home labor, insists Silbaugh, does not
destroy our understanding of its pricelessness anymore than calculating an appropriate amount
of life insurance destroys our understanding of the value of life. Id. at 96-97.
185. Id. at 99. There is no market for buying and selling people, yet life insurance policies
place a dollar value on a lost life. Id. at 96-97. And while there is no market for pain and
suffering, juries often afford them a monetized value.
186. Id. at 98-99.
187. Id. at 95. Concerns of sentimentality, which tend to be raised when women's financial
interests are at stake, engage the dubious proposition that "[w]hen love motivates work at
home, nothing but love should be its reward." Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 81. Given the serious
costs this proposition can inflict, "[c]oncern over women's lives becoming entirely
commodified seems by comparison an abstract worry." Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 84.
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array of tasks caretaking entails, from morning feedings to mid-day car
pooling to midnight nursing? While it may be clear that caretaking
contributes significant value to the economy as a whole,188 it is less clear how
this value can be quantified in an individual case. Silbaugh lists several
valuation methodologies: (1) ascertaining the market value of similar
services, (2) measuring the opportunity costs of the homemaker, and (3)
assigning an hourly wage based on the number of children and the size of
the home, with offsets for services purchased on the market.'8 9 While
Silbaugh acknowledges the quantification challenges of each of these
methodologies, she suggests that practice would make legal actors better
valuators and urges them to begin this process. "
There may be an easier way. While a parental compensation model
contributes importantly to reform discourse by forcing recognition of the
principle that caretaking is labor, and valuable labor at that,1 91 there may be
a more pragmatic way to ensure equity for primary caretakers. Partnership
offers a second model for income sharing during the unfinished business of
raising children that avoids the quantification difficulties of a compensation
model.
2. A Profit-Sharing Model
During windup, no partner ordinarily expects to receive compensation
for individual effort. Rather, partners simply continue to share profits and
losses as they did prior to dissolution. 192 Absent an agreement otherwise,
partners share equally. 93 No partner expects to retain all the profit or bear
all the loss generated during completion of partnership work because profit
and loss belong to the partnership at large, rather than to the individual
partners. An equal share of partnership profit is therefore ordinarily an
appropriate and sufficient consequence of a partner's individual labor
during the completion of unfinished partnership work.
This partnership framework provides a compelling model for divorces
involving minor children. Even after spouses end their marital partnership,
their work as parenting partners continues to support a complex
infrastructure of time, money and effort; of market labor and home labor; of
paychecks and child care; of enhanced human capital associated with
primary breadwinning; and lost market opportunities associated with
188. Silbaugh estimates the economic value of unpaid domestic labor at between twenty-
four percent to sixty percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 3.
189. See Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 80-81.
190. Id.
191. Silbaugh reasons that placing a monetary value on housework "would force an
increased appreciation of its value." Id. at 79.
192. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, § 8.5.
193. Id. § 8.3.1.
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primar • .194primary caregiving. Because parenting and the infrastructure necessary to
support it do not end when parents divorce, neither should their sharing of
these profits and losses.
Even after divorce, the individual labor of a parent in the nurture and
support of minor children should be viewed as labor expended on behalf of
the parenting partnership. During the period in which children require
continuing financial and physical support, no individual parent should bear
all the losses associated with caretaking and no individual parent should
enjoy all the gain associated with ideal worker status.1 9 As equal partners in
the work of parenting minor children, this model supports equal income
sharing, i.e., equalization of household standards of living until the youngest
child reaches majority.196
This parenting-partnership model may provoke the criticism that it
overcompensates a mother who benefits both from income sharing and
from a disproportionate share of the benefits of child rearing. The answer to
this concern is that, much as the law might like to do so, it is not possible to
value psychic gain and then to offset it against financial gain. Psychic
benefits simply cannot be quantified. Even an assumption that a primary
caretaker of children enjoys more psychic benefits than the other parent
may be erroneous, since psychic benefit is not necessarily time dependent. A
primary caretaker may devote long hours to the daily drudgeries necessary
to maintain a home for the child-shopping, cooking and cleaning-yet
reap little psychic benefit in the process. On the other hand, a non-primary
caretaker who devotes little time and energy to caretaking may reap huge
psychic benefits, as when he and his child enjoy a heart-to-heart talk about
the child's perceptions, troubles and hopes. The quantity of time spent on
children will not always reflect the quality of that time and is thus a poor
proxy for psychic gain. Moreover, opening the door to a balancing of
parental joys would raise a host of questions about the children themselves
and their propensity to inspire more joy than worry or sorrow or any of the
other psychic costs of parenting, which may fall disproportionately on the
children's primary caretaker.
Even when the presence of minor children supports income sharing, a
buyout price should be calculated at the time of dissolution. This buyout
price may be relatively small when minor children are present, since its size
is a function of the length of the marriage and the increase in earnings
during marriage. While payment of the buyout price may be deferred until
the youngest child reaches majority and income-sharing ends, it is important
194. See discussion supra Part I.B.
195. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 1-9.
196. Several commentators have proposed income-sharing at divorce. See, e.g., OKIN, supra
note 10; Rutherford, supra note 10; Singer, supra note 10; Starnes, supra note 10.
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to impose a buyout requirement even in cases of disparately enhanced
spousal earnings.
Fundamentally, spouses are partners in an adult relationship that
begins with an exchange of adult commitments, an expectation of adult joy,
and a risk of adult sorrow. When children are present, they may have a
profound effect on the adult relationship, but at least as a normative matter,
spouses do not abandon their commitments to each other when they
become parents. Instead, parents take on an additional mutual commitment
toward their children. As a practical matter, no-fault divorce laws do not
mistake parental commitments for spousal commitments, recognizing that
termination of the latter does not terminate the former. As childless couples
understand, and as empty-nesters discover, marriage is not exclusively about
children. 97 It would be a mistake to allow a legitimate interest in children to
obscure what should also be a legitimate interest in the adults who bear
them. When the marital partnership ends, a buyout should be required in
order to ensure fair play for adults, whether or not they are also parents.
CONCLUSION
The ALI's response to the costs of mothering is a reform proposal that
seeks to protect mothers by casting them as economic casualties of marriage
entitled to reparations for their loss. When intractable quantification
problems impede the effort to quantify loss, the ALI resorts to the
mathematics of the expected-gain models they shun. Casting mothers as
losers might be less disturbing if it were more necessary to achieve the
Institute's goals. It is not. Equally available is a reform model based not on
relief for suckers, but on rights for partners. Partnership casts mothers as full
stakeholders in ajoint venture, infusing reform discourse with an egalitarian
vocabulary free of stigmatizing conceptions of husbands and wives.
Moreover, partnership establishes a baseline of spousal equality-in
contribution, in responsibility, in right-against which all inequalities must
be justified, all old law tested for its ability to fit within a gender-neutral
paradigm. This Article offers an enriched partnership model for post-
divorce income sharing. Under this model, a divorcing mother may qualify
for a buyout of her interest in the marital partnership and, in cases involving
minor children, for income sharing during the unfinished work of the
parenting partnership. These proposals provide a conceptual rationale and
a quantification model for alimony while sending a message that mothers
are worthy of respect rather than pity.
197. A fertility test is not a precondition to a marriage license; marriage does not end
automatically when children reach age 18.
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